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Economics based dominance – has the tide turned?*  
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
There are many possible reasons for controlling market power. While in the United 
States the efficiency argument appears to have prevailed
1
, in the EU Treaty 
motivations such as political freedom are seen side by side with consumer welfare. 
Whatever the objective being pursued, it is undeniable that the laws of most 
industrialised jurisdictions seek, if not to constrain market power, to prohibit abuse or 
exploitation thereof. This article analyses, in particular, the EU approach to market 
power, the evolution of the assessment of market power and the levels thereof which 
cause the authorities to analyse the effects of a firm’s behaviour. Measurement of 
market power has been undergoing some changes in the EU and these are reviewed.
2
 
The measurement of market power by the US authorities is also considered and 
compared to the approaches taken by the EU authorities. 
 
In the US, Section 2 of the US Sherman Act, 1890 condemns unilateral conduct which 
monopolises or attempts to monopolise.
3
 Every person who shall monopolize, attempt 
to monopolise or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolise 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony.The US courts have interpreted this section as condemning  inter alia having 
“monopoly power in the relevant market and the wilful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen or historic accident”.4 
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1
 The Court’s concern was "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output." in the case of 
Fortner Entreprises Inc.v, United States Steel Corp.,   394 U.S., 495 (1969) 
2
 Market definition is a closely related topic and important to the assessment of 
dominance. However, the method of defining the relevant market is not the focus of 
this paper. Furthermore, collective dominance is not reviewed and the measurement 
of single firm dominance is the only aspect considered within this article.  
 
3
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." 
  
 
4
 United States v Grinnell Corp. (1966) 384 US 563, 570-71. 
 2 
By contrast, in the EU, Article 102 TFEU (formerly Article 82 EC) prohibits the 
abuse by an undertaking, or undertakings, of a dominant position in a substantial part 
of the common market that affects inter-State trade.
5
 
 
Damien Geradin made the point at the Global Competition Law Centre in July 2005 
that more emphasis seems to be placed on the concept of abuse than on the first prong 
of Article 82 – the requirement that the firm under scrutiny enjoys a dominant 
position. This is not to say that the law on dominance is clear, rather he asserts that 
there are many questions to be asked when considering dominance.
6
   
 
While both the US and EU provisions cover unilateral conduct by firms holding 
significant market power, it is not clear whether the degrees of market power required 
are the same. The differing terms of “monopoly power”(US) and “dominant position” 
(EU) may not hold the key to any substantive difference.
7
 The term “monopoly 
power” may be inaccurate however and that can be seen when the courts in the US 
apply the term to firms which do have competitors in the relevant market.
8
 They 
might be better described as dominant in the market in question. 
 
Another important difference is that in the US unilateral conduct which 
“monopolises” is a breach of law – conduct which creates the monopoly power is thus 
captured. Whereas, in the EU what is prohibited is the abuse of an existing dominant 
position.   
 
Establishing Market Power 
 
Why is market power relevant? Establishing the anticompetitive effect of commercial 
conduct is a costly business, and the defence of those allegations is also costly. A firm 
with market power – or firms in Article 101 TFEU (formerly Article 81) cartel 
situations – are far more likely to create anti-competitive effects.  
 
To have businesses constantly taking cautious approaches to commerce for fear of 
producing (allegations of) anticompetitive effects might have very negative results. So 
                                                 
5
 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
6
  
7
 Elhauge & Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2007) page 233 
8
 Elhauge & Geradin, op. cit. 
 3 
the requirement of market power applies, and applies in particular to unilateral 
conduct. Because direct proof of anticompetitive effects is so hard to achieve, courts 
often rely on the combination of market power with conduct likely to have 
anticompetitive effects, and thereby infer anticompetitive effect from that 
combination.
9
 
     
A problem with the over-emphasis on market power is that firms can have acquired 
market power due to efficiencies, product innovation or good servicing standards - for 
example, by producing cheaper equivalent products which drive others out of the 
market. 
 
Economists have many tests of market power. These often relate to pricing freedom; 
whether the firm can charge higher prices than the marginal cost
10
; whether the firm 
can price discriminate; whether the firm can price above competitive levels
11
; or 
whether the firm has the power to constrain output in order to raise market prices and 
profits.. 
So far as courts are concerned, the US Supreme Court has defined “monopoly power” 
as the power to control prices or exclude competition.
12
 In the EU the term 
“dominance” is a legal one13, but more recently economic considerations have 
become important to its interpretation. For example, in the case of France Telecom, 
the Court of First Instance did not rely on presumptions of dominance where large 
market shares existed, rather the Court took account of additional factors too.
14
 As 
described below, in assessing the dominance of an entity with 70% -80% market 
share, the Court nonetheless analysed the characteristics of the market in greater 
detail. This represents a shift from a previous position of “rebuttable presumption” of 
dominance, as described below. 
 
Degrees of Market Power 
 
When market power has been shown to exist, the degree of the firm’s market power 
will usually be analysed by reference to demand elasticity. In other words, if the price 
is raised, does demand fall and do consumers choose another product. In United 
Brands v Commission the Court of Justice defined dominance as “a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers”.15  
 
Some commentators argue that all firms, including dominant firms, are subject to 
commercial constraints and, whether as a result of competitors or the behaviour of 
                                                 
9
 Elhauge & Geradin, op. cit., at page 237 
10
 Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop “Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law” 76 Geo. L.J. 
241 (1987 – 1988) 
11
 Landes & Posner “Market Power in Antitrust  Cases” 94 (1981) Harvard Law Review, no. 5, 937. 
 
12
 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).  
13
 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission,(1973) ECR 
215   
14
 Case T-340/03 France Telecom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II–107 
15
 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
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customers, cannot act independently in the sense used in United Brands.
16
 In other 
words, a higher price will usually result in fewer sales, for whatever reason. For those 
reasons, the commentators regard the firm’s ability to “prevent effective competition 
from being maintained” as a better test of dominance. From an economic point of 
view, competition is effective when no firm can exercise substantial market power 
and the usual definition of market power is the ability to profitably raise price above 
the level which would prevail if there was competition in the market. 
 
Others argue that there are two separate tests here, namely (i) the power to behave 
independently of competitors, customers and consumers, and (ii) the ability to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market.
17
 However, the courts 
have never drawn this distinction and the use of the term “by affording” suggests that 
two separate elements are not intended, rather that one is the means and the other the 
end. 
 
However, the test is not an absolute one. Many firms possess some market power and 
a change to their commercial practices will likely elicit a “response” by a competitor. 
What is worthy of scrutiny is the firm which possesses substantial market power. This 
is captured by the Court of Justice of the European Union’s reference to a firm being 
able to behave “to an appreciable extent” independently of others. In the 
Commission’s Communication giving “guidance on its enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82”, published in December 2008, (“the 2008 Guidance”) it 
confirmed that it would investigate whether a firm had substantial market power over 
a significant period of time. 
 
Competition law commentators and enforcement agencies use two indicators of 
substantial market power – power over price and the power to exclude. While the EU 
cases have focussed on ability to behave independently, i.e., the ability to set prices 
without losing customers and to exercise pricing discretion, yet often the reliance is 
on issues related to size of market share. While the economists’ sensitivity to price 
discretion is cited by courts, often the market power is inferred, according to Landes 
and Posner, from the size of market shares.
18
 This, they assert, can be misleading.
19
 In 
addition, it has been noted that where the definition of the product market is 
unrealistic, market share can be very misleading and can vary significantly
20
, as 
happened in the Alcoa case.
21
  
 
Other commentators assert that market power should be assessed using competitive 
benchmark prices. Hausman and Sidak observe that the tendency of regulators to 
                                                 
16
 GCLC Research Papers on Article 82, EC, The Concept of Dominance, Geradin, Hofer, Louis, Petit 
and Walker, July 2005. See also Landes and Posner op. cit.  
17
 R. Whish, Competition Law (5
th
 ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) at p. 179 and S. Bishop and M. 
Walker,  TheEconomics of EC Competition Law, 2
nd
 Ed. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2002 at para. 
6.06.  
18
 Landes & Posner, “Market Power in Antitrust Cases” 94 (1981) Harvard Law Review, no. 5, 937. 
19
 ibid Landes & Posner at p. 947 where they say it can be misleading because of the possibility of 
entry of new competitors into the market, for example. 
20
 Gellhorn & Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics,  (4
th
 ed., West Publishing Co., 1994) At p. 114 
  
21
 Aluminium Co. of America, United States v. Alcoa-Rome 377 U.S. 271 (1964) In that case two 
differing definitions of the relevant product market caused the market share of the firm in question to 
alter from 33% to 90%.  
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calculate market shares and assess market concentration when ascertaining whether 
market power exists, is widespread. 
22
 They assert that if substantial market power 
exists, consumers will pay supracompetitive
23
 prices, and that drawing market power 
inferences from the structure of the relevant market leads to flawed conclusions on the 
existence of substantial market power. A price-based economic analysis would, they 
argue, lead to a more accurate test of substantial market power. 
 
Interestingly Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge
24
 focussed on 
degrees of dominance and expressed the view that a firm which had a quasi-monopoly 
possessed “superdominance” and therefore had an “onerous special obligation” not to 
harm the structure of whatever weak competition they face. The term and concept 
were not adopted by the Court of Justice expressly but in the Tetra Pak II
25
 and 
Microsoft
26
 cases, the Courts (i.e., the General Court (CFI as it then was), and the 
Court of Justice) and the Commission respectively, implied that a dominant position 
could easily be identified when the firm in question had a quasi-monopoly or 
approached a position of complete monopoly, with market share being a key 
determinant of very substantial market power in this context.  
 
Measuring Market Power 
 
(i) Market Shares in the EU as an indicator of market power (dominance) 
 
Prior to 2005 
 
In general, in EU jurisprudence, the level of market share that had been  held to 
confirm the existence of a dominant position has been lower than what would be 
deemed necessary to prove monopoly power in US jurisprudence.  
 
The definition of dominance given by the Court of Justice in the United Brands 
judgment, described above, was accepted and expanded upon soon thereafter a series 
of judgments, most notably Hoffman La Roche and Akzo. In Hoffman La Roche the 
Court of Justice repeated the definition and acknowledged that the existence of a 
dominant position could be derived from a number of factors, but that amongst those, 
“a highly important one is the existence of large market shares”. The Court stated that 
“very large market shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, 
evidence of the existence of a dominant position”.27  In that case a dominant position 
was established, for all bar one of the vitamins, largely by reliance on the market 
shares of between 64% - 95%. 
 
However, in the AKZO case market shares of 50% (or above) were held by the court 
to be sufficient to justify the rebuttable presumption that, save in exceptional 
circumstances, that the firm in question held a dominant position in the relevant 
                                                 
22
 Hausman & Sidak, “Evaluating market power using competitive benchmark prices instead of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index” (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 387. 
23
 Supracompetitive prices are those which are extreme and thought not to be objectively defensible. 
The suggestion is that they are so competitive as to be predatory. 
24
 Case C-395/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission  [2000] ECR I 1365 
25
 Tetra Pak International SA  v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951 at para. 31. 
26
 Case COMP-C-3/37.792 Microsoft [1994] ECR II 755 
27
 Case 85/76, Hoffman La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 at para… .   
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market.
28
 The Court of First Instance reiterated the Hoffman La Roche approach by 
stating that “according to the case-law, very large market shares are in themselves, 
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position. 
That is the situation when there is a market share of 50%.”29 
 
Monti makes the point that, in most cases, the Commission had found dominance with 
market shares over the 50% mark.
30
 The use of market share as the determinant of 
dominance by the Commission, the institution responsible for the administrative 
decision, was deeply rooted. One side effect of this approach which seemed to create 
a presumption of dominance where market shares were over 50%, was to shift the 
burden of proof onto the defendant. 
 
Market shares in the 40-50% range could also be major indicators of dominance, but 
only where other circumstances, such as barriers to entry, the possession of superior 
technology, or the control of essential assets, when allied to market share, gave the 
accused firm an undeniable advantage in the market place. Market share at these 
levels, on its own, would not be sufficient to confer dominance.
31
  
n Virgin/British Airways a market share of less than 40% (39.7%) held by British 
Airways was found to confer a dominant position in the market for UK air travel 
agency services. That was the first instance where a market share of less than 40%, 
albeit in conjunction with other factors, resulted in a finding of dominance.
32
 The 
General Court (CFI as it then was) in its judgment of 17
th
 December 2003 took 
account too of the range of transport services and hub network operated by British 
Airways. The Court went on to describe the airline as “an obligatory business partner 
of travel agents”.33That finding was not one of the five pleas in law raised before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.
34
  
 
In Saba II the ECJ held that a market share of 10% is virtually certain not to amount 
to a dominant position.
35
 And a firm with a market share below 25% was always seen 
as unlikely to have inferred against it that it occupied a dominant position.
36
  
 
In the US the authorities have been less inclined to provide such guidance on 
monopoly power by reference to market shares. Where guidance on market share 
percentages have been given by US authorities, the percentages triggering closer 
scrutiny of the effect of the firm’s conduct have been higher. For example in the first 
Alcoa case Judge Learned Hand referred to the fact that a market share of 60% 
rendered a monopoly position doubtful.
37
 
                                                 
28
 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I3359.  
29
 ibid AKZO at para. 60. 
30
 G. Monti, “The Concept of Dominance in Article 82” (2006) Vol. 2 European Competition Journal, 
July issue, 31. 
31
 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
 
32
 Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2003] ECR II-5917. 
33
 Ibid at para. 217 
34
 Case C-95/04 British Airways plc v Commission [2007] 4 CMLR p.22 
35
 Case 75/84 Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1986] ECR 3021. 
36
 A view which was reinforced by recital 32 of the EC Merger Regulation (Reg. 139/2004) which set 
out a presumption that a concentration significantly impeding competition in the Common Market 
could not be created if the parties’ joint market share did not exceed 25%. 
37
 United States v Aluminium company of America 148 F.2d. 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 
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The 2005 to 2008 Commission Review  
 
The policy of DG Competition on Article 102 (formerly Article 82) was under review 
by the last quarter of 2005 when it published a Discussion Paper on Exclusionary 
Abuse
38
, illustrating an intention to shift towards a more economics-based analysis. 
There were cases around this time in which some shift was visible, in the sense that 
dominance was being measured using more economic theory than before. In British 
Airways
39
, the emphasis of the General Court (then the Court of First Instance) was on 
relative market share. That Court had referred to the increased anti-competitive effects 
of conduct where the dominant firm held a “very much larger market share than its 
competitors” and the CJEU (then the ECJ) did not contradict this approach in any 
way.
40
 The Court of First Instance had also focussed on the market share of the closest 
rival and the cumulative shares of the five main competitors in comparison to that of 
the largest player. While the analysis of relative market share showed a commercial 
approach, the taking account of relative market share was not innovative. 
 
In the Summary of the Commission Decision in Tomra the Commission stressed not 
just the very high market shares of the undertakings, which exceeded 70%, and the 
fact that the shares were a multiple of the market shares of its competitors but also 
Tomra’s “ability and determination to acquire its most serious competitors and/or 
competitors with potential to become such in the future”.41   
 
In France Telecom too the relative market shares were held to be key to the finding of 
dominance and the Court of First Instance referred to “a market share much greater 
than that of its number one competitor”.42 The Court also stressed the “considerable 
advantages over its competitors” enjoyed by the undertaking through a link-up with a 
group and so took account of barriers to entry too. This approach was taken in spite of 
the Court first stating that “very large shares are in themselves, and save in 
exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position. This is 
so, for example, in the case of a 50% market share.”43 In spite of that statement and 
the fact that France Telecom had market shares of 70% to 80%, the court took stock 
of other factors pertaining to the market and thus appeared to be taking a new 
approach as regards the assessment of dominance. Interestingly, the decision of the 
Court has been criticised for failing to extend the new approach to the question of 
whether there was an abuse.
44
   
 
Since December 2008 
 
The Discussion Paper resulted in the publication by DG Competition of the 2008 
Guidance (on the application of Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU)  to 
                                                 
38
 DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary 
Abuses (December 2005), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf 
39
 Case T-219/99 British Airways Plc v. Commission 
40
 Case C-95/04 P British Airways Plc v Commission [2007] ECR - I p. 2331 
41
 Case COMP/E-1/38.113  Prokent/Tomra, C 219/11 OJ.E.U. [2008] 28.8.2008. 
42
 Case T-340/03 France Telecom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II–107. 
43
 ibid. 
44
 Faella “The antitrust assessment of loyalty discounts and rebates”  Journal of Competition Law 
&Economics 2008, 4(2), p. 375 . See also Ezrachi A. Article 82 EC: Reflections on its Recent 
Evolution, Chapter 1 by Kavanagh, Marshall and Niels at p. 17   
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exclusionary abuses). The 2008 Guidance acknowledges that the first step in the 
application of Article 82 is to assess whether an undertaking is dominant and the 
document provides guidance on that aspect. Confirming that dominance is established 
following an investigation of whether the firm in question held substantial market 
power over a protracted period of time, the Commission acknowledged that it must 
also assess as part of this analysis whether there are other constraints on the firm’s 
conduct. This represents a shift in the Commission’s approach to the determination of 
dominance.  
 
Usefully for national competition authorities, business managers and their legal 
advisers, the Commission went as far as to give a certain amount of comfort to the 
effect that market shares of less than 40% are unlikely to amount to dominance, 
though this was hardly new as the existing jurisprudence already followed that line. 
However, the 2008 Guidance acknowledges that there may be, even in cases below 
that 40% threshold, situations where competitors cannot constrain the conduct of a 
dominant undertaking, and so does not close off the possibility that dominant market 
power may be established even in sub-40% market share context in extreme cases.  
 
The 2008 Guidance continues to the effect that, even in cases of high market shares, 
the Commission will not generally conclude on whether to pursue a case without 
examining all factors which might constrain the behaviour of the undertaking – and so 
prevent them being able to act independently. This represents a shift from the AKZO 
position (whereby exceptional circumstances were required to disprove dominance 
when a firm’s market share was over 50%). This policy is one which gives greater 
comfort to efficient firms which perform well in any given sector. The statement is a 
very definitive move from a form-based approach and indicates a willingness to take 
account of commercial constraints which apply even to firms with significant market 
share.  
 
 
Since publication of the 2008 Guidance, the Commission’s decision in the Intel case 
has been published. It is interesting to compare how the Commission presented its 
Decision first, by way of Press Release, and then later by way of the actual published 
Decision itself. They are not always consistent.  
 
In the Press Release, the Commission confirmed that it was acting in the interests of 
consumers and that its focus was on safeguarding competition on the merits. The 
Commission noted that the proceedings began before the 2008 Guidance was issued, 
therefore the 2008 Guidance did not formally apply. However, the Commission 
asserted that the Decision was in line with the orientations of the 2008 Guidance and 
that it included an effects-based analysis of Intel’s conduct. 
 
In the Summary of the Commission Decision, the market share of Intel over a ten year 
period was noted to be very high, having been “in excess of or around 70%” but it 
was “[O]n the basis of Intel’s market shares and the barriers to entry and expansion” 
that the Commission concluded that Intel held a dominant position in the market.
45
  
In the DG Competition Newsletter, commentators note that the 2008 Guidance  
confirms the Commission’s recent practice of not relying only, or primarily, on 
                                                 
45
 O.J.E.U. [2009] C 227/14 22.9.2009. 
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market shares when assessing dominance but rather of making a comprehensive 
analysis of whether the allegedly dominant firm is constrained in some way.
46
  
 
The point is interesting because in the Intel Decision itself, published on May 13, 
2009 the Commission refers to the “notion of independence which is the special 
feature of dominance” and confirms that a dominant undertaking is one with 
“substantial market power”.47 The Decision proceeds to state that market shares 
“provide a useful first indication for the Commission of the market structure”. In the 
conclusion, having established the existence of consistent market shares in excess of 
or around 70% and 80% over a six year period, the formula expressed in Akzo is 
repeated. The Decision then cites Hilti and states that market shares of 70% and 80% 
have been held to be in themselves a clear indication of the existence of a dominant 
position.
48
  However, in a manner prescient of the 2008 Guidance, the Commission 
states at paragraph (852) of it’s Decision that this insight is subject to further 
verification by reference to contextual factors such as barriers to entry and expansion 
and buyer power. Having cited case law in support of other statements, this position is 
stated de novo and without any reference to traditional form-based authorities. The 
tide appears to be shifting as regards the assessment of dominance from rebuttable 
presumption to closer scrutiny.  
 
(ii) Treatment of Other Factors indicating Dominance in the EU 
 
Prior to December 2008 
 
While the Commission’s Decision in Continental Can49 was very focussed on the 
power of the monopolist to set prices and make other market decisions without the 
constraints of competitive pressures, and was approved by the Court of Justice
50
, in 
United Brands the indicators of dominance appeared greater in number. 
 
In its Judgment in United Brands the Court of Justice referred to a position of 
“economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition”51. As Korah52 notes, that is a broader phrase which could be said to 
cover a situation where there is no power over price but there is an ability to keep 
others out of a market.
53
  
 
                                                 
46
 Peeperkorn & Viertio, “Implementing an effects-based approach to Article 82” Competition Policy 
Newsletter 2009- 1 at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpn_2009_1.html 
47
 At paragraph 839 of the Decision   
48
 Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667. 
49
 Decision 6/72 O.J. [1972] L.7/25. 
50
 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission,(1973) ECR 
215   
 
51
 [1978] ECR 207 at para 65. 
52
 Korah “An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice” (Oxford and Portland,Oregon) 
2007 9
th
 ed. P. 106 
53
 For example, in United Brands the Commission found, and the Court of Justice confirmed, that 
United Brands was dominant in a market where it engaged in a price war with its main competitor and 
had made significant losses over the previous five years’ trading. The power of the company to prevent 
independent dealers buying bananas at the ports of entry and selling them on was one factor which was 
critical to the finding of dominance. 
 10 
Another concept which emerged as an indicator of dominance was that of 
“unavoidable trading partner“.54  The concept can be equated with monopoly and 
frequently the position is reached by virtue of the possession or control of an essential 
facility. In Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission the Court of Justice used the 
expression to describe the firm which exclusively had television broadcasting 
schedules, capable of being used to generate a for-profit consumer magazine.
55
     
 
 
Many agree that market share is a flawed tool for the assessment of dominance.
56
 
Market share gives no information about potential competition
57
, and in the absence 
of entry and exit barriers, even a monopolist may be prevented from raising prices 
above the competitive level.
58
 The threat, or possibility, of a market entry would 
prevent independent behaviour and ensure that the monopolist could not prevent 
effective competition. So, additional factors must be identified to substantiate the 
substantial market power claim.  
 
Interestingly, in its Microsoft decision
59
 the Commission did not rest its case 
exclusively on the 93% market share of the firm but referred also to certain barriers to 
entry. The Commission was criticised for failing to move to an economics-based 
analysis in that decision, but in its assessment of dominance it appears to be taking a 
broader approach, even if the analysis of abuse was still form-based rather than 
economics-based.
60
 
 
Since December 2008 
 
In the 2008 Guidance the Commission acknowledges that, in general, a dominant 
position derives from a combination of several factors, which, taken separately, are 
not necessarily determinative. The Commission states that it will assess dominance by 
taking into account the competitive structure of the market and, in particular;  
 
- Constraints imposed on the accused firm by existing supplies from, and the position 
on the market of, actual competitors 
- Constraints imposed on the accused firm by the credible threat of future expansion 
by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors 
 
- Constraints imposed on the accused firm by the bargaining strength of the firm’s 
customers   
    
The Commission “will interpret market shares in the light of the relevant market 
conditions” and view market shares only as “a useful first indication … of the market 
structure”. 
 
                                                 
54
 Hoffman La-Roche & Co AG v Commission (85/76) [1979] ECR 461, para 41. 
55
 RTE & ITP v Commission (Joined Cases C-241,242/91 P), (1995)I ECR, 743 
56
 Tardiff & Weisman “The Dominant Firm Revisited” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
(2009) 5 (3), p. 517  
57
 Potential competition refers to the possibility of a new entry into the relevant market. 
58
 Elhauge & Geradin, op. cit. 
59
 Microsoft v. EC Commission [2005]  ECR II, p. 1491 
60
 Ahlborn & Evans,”The Microsoft judgment and its implications for competition policy towards 
dominant firms in Europe” (2009) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 887.   
 11 
The 2008 Guidance refers to the investigation by the Commission into whether or not 
there are sufficient constraints on the firm’s conduct by existing competitors and their 
output, by expansion or entry of rivals and/or by countervailing buying power.  
 
 
(a) Expansion or Entry 
 
The 2008 Guidance takes account of the commercial reality that competition cannot 
be assessed solely at a point in time, but rather that the competitive constraints 
applicable to any firm can change easily and quickly. The potential for competition 
should a competitor expand, or a new firm enter the market, must also be taken into 
account according to the 2008 Guidance.  Such potential competition can curtail a 
firm from raising prices and the easier entry to the market is, the more likely a firm 
will be mindful of its threat. The Commission clarifies that it will take this into 
account where expansion or entry is “likely, timely and sufficient”. To be considered 
likely the Commission must be convinced that expansion or entry would be profitable 
for the other firm – taking account, inter alia, of entry or expansion barriers and the 
likely commercial response of the allegedly dominant firm. For expansion or entry to 
be considered timely, it must be fast enough to interfere with substantial market 
power. Finally, to be considered sufficient the expansion or entry must be on a large 
enough scale to inhibit any attempts by the allegedly dominant firm to raise prices.      
 
Barriers to expansion or entry can be legal barriers, economies of scale enjoyed by the 
allegedly dominant firm, privileged access to natural resources, important 
technologies or an established sales and distribution network. The Commission also 
acknowledges that the firm itself may have created the barrier by, for example, 
entering into long-term contracts with customers which have foreclosing effects.  
 
Geradin had correctly made the point that barriers to expansion can be low even 
where barriers to entry are high.
61
 So an apparently dominant firm with a high market 
share may have little market power (this it is submitted is the weakness of the form-
based approach where high market shares automatically inferred large market power). 
Sunk costs are costs which have to be incurred to compete in a market but which are 
not recoverable and they are key to assessing the height of barriers to entry and 
barriers to expansion. The interplay between them is interesting – if, in fast moving 
consumer goods for example, the question of branding is very important, then the 
high costs of advertising and “building a brand” may operate as a barrier to entry. 
However, once the brand is established by the firm in a market, the addition of 
another product and thus the expansion by the firm may face only low barriers to 
entry.
62
      
 
In its Decision in Intel the Commission appears to be informally applying the criteria 
set in the 2008 Guidance, referring, as it does, inter alia, to the nature and size of sunk 
costs as a barrier to entry and expansion. And in the Court of First Instance’s decision 
in Clearstream the Court held, irrespective of high market share, that the net question 
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was whether the undertaking had an “ability to influence appreciably the conditions in 
which” any remaining competition might be exerted.63 
    
(b) Countervailing buyer power 
  
The Commission also acknowledged that a firm with a high market share might not be 
able to act independently of customers who had strong bargaining power. The power 
may flow from the customers’ size or their commercial significance for the allegedly 
dominant firm and their ability to switch quickly to another competing supplier. If 
there is adequate countervailing buyer power, it might inhibit an attempt by the firm 
to profitably increase prices.   
 
(iii) Market Shares in the U.S. 
 
Some commentators make the point that the US courts seem to be confused about 
whether “market power” and “monopoly power” are the same thing.64  Those 
commentators assert that the terms refer to the same thing and that the terms 
themselves are not important, rather the focus should be on anticompetitive economic 
power which harms, or can harm, consumer welfare.  
 
The tendency to infer monopoly, or market, power from market share is also evident 
in US decisions. Muris explains that US courts have also inferred market power from 
market share and entry conditions, describing market share as “a proxy for actual 
proof of anticompetitive effects.”65 Judge Learned Hand stated that a market share of 
ninety percent “is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty … 
percent would be enough ; and certainly thirty-three percent is not”.66 As in the EU 
decisions, no ‘brightline’ boundaries are drawn but the Supreme Court had indicated 
that market shares in excess of 66% suggest monopoly power.
67
 However, no lower 
threshold was ever stated expressly.  
 
In the U.S. courts too, an evolution as regards the use of market share to measure 
market power, can be seen. In the Grinnell case of 1966, the idea that monopoly 
power “ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market” was 
acceptable. It has been noted that, in the early cases courts often moved from finding 
a large market share to examining conduct, without establishing actual market 
power.
68
   However, when the case of Hunt-Wesson Foods was decided in 1980, the 
court held that “blind reliance upon market share, divorced form commercial reality, 
could give a misleading picture of a firm’s actual ability to control prices or exclude 
competition”.69  
 
 
                                                 
63
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In the face of criticism of overreliance on market share as an indicator of market 
power, the courts extended their scrutiny and in Kodak the court focussed on market 
share and the high barriers to entry into that market.
70
 The point made is that in some 
markets where a firm held as much as a one hundred percent market share, that firm 
may have no ability to raise prices or achieve monopoly profits if, for example, 
barriers to entry were very low.
71
 However, in the Kodak decision the Supreme  
Court analysed the way in which switching costs and information costs insulated 
Kodak in the aftermarket and contributed significantly to that company’s substantial 
market power. By definition, aftermarkets are ones in which a lesser focus on market 
share and a greater focus on consumer mobility seem appropriate. While there has 
been criticism of the application of the Kodak decision by lower courts, such as to 
render the Kodak doctrine toothless, the case illustrates an awareness of the role of 
switching and information costs.
72
 
 
A distinguishing feature has however always been that the U.S. decisions did not 
elevate certain percentage market shares to the status of presumptions and, as Muris 
noted, entry conditions were also taken into account.  
 
Another aspect of the U.S. approach is the Department of Justice / Federal Trade 
Commission Guidelines. These take a more economics based approach to questions of 
market share and market power. One illustration of this is the analysis of the effects of 
other market participants on the freedom to act of the firm charged with monopoly 
and holding the large market share. While the guidelines were drafted with mergers 
and horizontal agreements in mind, they have been a reference point in Section 2 
cases too. 
 
 
Reasons for the differing treatment can be attributed to the ordoliberal influence on 
E.C. competition law and policy. The ordoliberal movement was very focussed on 
market structure and inherently suspicious of concentrated markets.  Ahlborn and 
Evans identify a number of manifestations of the ordoliberal influence when Article 
82 is concerned. On the dominance side, they include a low threshold of dominance in 
market share terms and a presumption of dominance where the threshold is reached.
73
 
Those authors make the point that many of the economic theories on which those 
views are based have been disproved by modern economic theory, for example the 
view that concentrated markets were anathema to competition on the merits. 
 
(iv) Other factors indicating monopoly power in the U.S. 
 
 
There are a number of means to illustrate that other factors can indicate monopoly 
power in the US, as described above. One very significant example of other factors 
being taken into account to assess market or monopoly power is the doctrine of 
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essential facilities.The doctrine of essential facilities is attributed to the US Supreme 
Court in the case of United States v Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis.
74
 
 
In analysing the decision of the Supreme Court in the Grinnell case
75
, Elhauge notes 
that it is difficult to distinguish between “wilful acquisition or maintenance of 
[monopoly] power” and “growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product”.76 However, in ordering the sharing of facilities in Aspen77 and the reversal 
of a refusal to supply in Eastman Kodak
78
, the Supreme Court clearly took account of 
factors other than market share.  The essential facilities concept epitomises the barrier 
to entry argument.   
 
The “applications barrier to entry” played a key role in the Microsoft cases, at 
Department of Justice and court levels.
79
 The term refers to the fact that developing 
and launching a competing operating system will only be commercially viable if 
consumers can find sufficient applications to run on that new operating system. The 
corollary is that developers will only develop applications to run on operating systems 
already used by many. So an operating system entrant faces a significant barrier to 
entry. The plaintiffs alleged that this applications barrier to entry allowed Microsoft to 
enjoy substantial and enduring market power in the market for personal computers. 
Ultimately that view was upheld.    
 
It is interesting to note the reliance on other factors, such as the applications barrier to 
entry, in spite of the market share in excess of 90%. 
 
 
 
The Effects of the Modernisation Regulation
80
 
 
While the 2008 Guidance gave insights into the Commission’s work plan and 
priorities as regards Article 82 for the future, it’s status for, and influence on, national 
competition authorities and courts in the member states is relatively untested.  
 
In the application of national competition laws, where no Article 102 jurisdiction is 
established, the commercial and judicial certainty of market share tools for assessing 
dominance may still prove popular.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Market share cannot be discounted entirely as a tool for measuring market power and 
it provides indicators as to the effects of abusive conduct.
81
 However, the balance 
evident now in the Commission’s assessment of dominance - the account taken of 
other constraints, of potential competition, as well as of market share - is to be 
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welcomed. It would appear that dominance itself is being assessed by a greater use of 
economic analysis.   
 
For the shift to be meaningful however, it will require consistent application by the 
Commission and also have to find support within the Courts, the institutions of appeal 
and ultimate decision makers on dominance. To complete the move to an effects-
based approach to abuse of dominant position, the question of what constitutes an 
abuse will also require a new approach.  
 
 
* This article is a more developed paper based on an initial paper delivered at an 
interdisciplinary seminar on Article 82 (as it then was), hosted by the 
International Commercial and Economic Law Group at University of Limerick 
in September 2009.     
